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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case pursuant to UCA §78-2-2 and UCA §78-2a-
3(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the court incorrectly Apply Res Judicata to this particular case. 
Determinative law: 
I. The Doctrines of Res Judicata 
Standard of review: 
This is an issue of law. When reviewing an issue of law the Appellant Court 
accords the Court's legal conclusions no deference and reviews them for 
correctness. 
Nova Casualty Company v. Able Construction, Inc., 983 P 2d 575 (Utah 1999). 
II. Whether the court incorrectly applied Statute of Limitations. 
Standard of review: 
An Appellate Court will not overturn a trial court's factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous, 
J.A. Jones Const Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 89 P.3d 1009 
Harris v. IES Associates, 69 P.3d 297 (Utah App. 2003). 
Ill, Whether the court incorrectly applied Statute of Frauds. 
Determinative Law: 
Wessel v Eilenberger, 2 IU.2d 522,119N.E.2d 207 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one 
year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating 
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act 
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
Standard of review: 
Statutes of Frauds, the only purpose of which is to prevent fraud, to be used where 
the effect will be to accomplish a fraud and if the facts are such that it could be a virtual 
fraud to permit the defendant to interpose the statute, a court shall not listen to that 
defense. To now rely upon the Statute of Frauds would have the effect of perpetrating a 
fraud, not preventing one. 
An Appellate Court will not overturn a trial court's factual findings unless they re 
clearly erroneous. 
IV. Whether the trial court erred in preventing testimony by Plaintiff on the 
fraud issues. 
Determinative law: 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV 
Standard of review: 
This is purely an issue of law. When reviewing an issue of law the 
Appellant Court accords the Court's legal conclusions no deference 
and reviews them for correctness. 
VI. Whether the Court erred in awarding Defendants Summary Judgment. 
Standard of review: 
This is purely an issue of law. When reviewing an issue of law the Appellant 
Court accords the Trial Court's legal conclusions no deference and reviews them 
for correctness. 
Nova Casualtly Comfany v. Able Construction, Inc., 983 P 2d 575 (Utah 1999). 
We review the district court's order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the 
same standards as the district court under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rg,, Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 449 F.3d 1106,1111 (10th Cir. 2006). 
Summary judgment is proper only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Zamora, 449 F.3d at 1112 (citation omitted). We resolve all factual disputes and 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citation omitted). If 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court determines whether the substantive 
law was correctly applied by the district court. IcL (citation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVIE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND 
RULES 
Copies of all determinative constitution provisions, statutes, and rules are attached 
hereto as Addendum "B". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was initiated by the Plaintiff with the filing of a Complaint on or 
about August 14,2007; Plaintiff requested a Jury; Defendants' answered. Plaintiff filed 
Third Amended Complaint September 3,2008 and again on November 5,2008; Plaintiff 
requested a Jury; Defendants' Answered on November 14,2008. Defendants' provided 
Discovery material by July 7, 2009. The following briefs were filed regarding this 
matter: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") and the Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ('Memorandum"), dated July 7, 
2009 and filed on July 13,2009; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Opposition"), filed on July 20,2009; Defendants' 
Reply in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment ('Reply'), filed on July 31, 
2009. A Hearing was held on September 21,2009, wherein Plaintiff Tonda Hampton 
appeared pro se, and Justin Baer appeared on behalf of Defendants Professional Title 
Services, a corporation and Clay Holbrook, an Individual. After reviewing the briefs filed 
by the parties and hearing oral argument, the Court finds and orders as follows: 
It is therefore ordered that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted 
as to all of Plaintiffs' claims for the reasons stated herein, and judgment is granted in 
favor of Defendants' against Plaintiff. Order shall act as the final order of this matter 
Dated October 7,2009.. 
Plaintiff causes of actions; Declaratory Judgment, Breach of Contract, Breach of 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Slander of Title, and Negligence. 
Defendants' Defenses of Res Judicata, Statute of Limitations, Statute of Frauds 
and the alleged Oral Agreement. 
Plaintiff filed a timely Appeal. There are no related appeals that resembles this case. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Defendants Professional Title Services, a Corporation is a business in the state of 
Utah. Defendant Clay G. Holbrook is an individual. These above mentioned Defendants 
have an obligation and a duty to perform within there profession. Mr. Holbrook (Clay) 
stated, "Court ordered the sale" Plaintiff, (Tonda) then asked "then you're to do your job, 
title search, a thorough title search, did you do that"? Clay's response, "Yes", (see 
Plaintiffs Memo. Opposition to Def. Sum. Jud Affid. of Tonda Hampton, exhibit 25 at 
pg. 6, lines 37, 38, 39. . . During a 1999 Divorce action parties', Tonda Lynn Hampton 
and her Joint Tenant, Mr. Jensen, are court ordered to sell a portion of real estate in order 
to avoid a looming Foreclosure on 6.32 acres (House Parcel) they had Mortgaged on 
May 7,1998. 
On January 23,2002, a filed "Stipulation Order on Respondent's Motion to Lift 
Lis Pendens on Portions of Property and Approve Sale Conditions", (see Defs' 
Professional Title Services (PTS), and Clay Holbrook (CH). Sum. Jud. Exh. G). "The 
remaining proceeds are to be deposited into an "Interest Bearing Trust Account....with 
both signatures required for disbursements, which funds are to be distributed as Court 
orders and as the parties may agree", (Def. Memo.Sum. Jud. Exhibit G, pg5, at no. 8 
(PTS000485)). 
The "Sellers Settlement Statement" to House Parcel has a balance of $ 42,060.94, 
(see Def. PTS and CH Memo. Sum. Jud. at Exh. H; Affid. of Clay G. Holbrook pg. 3, no. 
12, see also exh. 1). 
The "Sellers Settlement Statement" to 675 acres (Vacant Parcel) has a balance of 
$40,466.15. see Exhibit 2. 
Settlement Statement Vacant Parcel also lists a "Seller Financing Note &Trust 
Deed" for $85,000.00 dollars, see ("Trust Deed Note") at TH Memo. Oppositon to 
Defs'Mot. Sum. Jud. Affid. of TH, ExhibitlO) also, Defendants' stated; "an additional 
$85,000 was financed.. .and it was supposed to be paid to the attorneys....supposed to put 
in escrow (see Exhibit 25 at pg 4 line7). These Three Sum equal to the amount of 
$167,527.09. Plaintiff is entitled to half of this total and interest. 
The 1999 Divorce case Final Order entered on December 17,2002; 1. Dismissed 
with prejudice; 2. Lis Pendens ordered released; 3. "....Petitioner is awarded attorney 
fees upon ... .or release of the funds held in Trust by Respondent's Former 
Attorney...(see Def. Memo. Sum. Jud, Exhibit N at Exhibit 1-"ORDER" filed Dec. 17, 
2002). 
Hampton had filed several cases against her Joint Tenant, Mr. Jensen, to collect 
her share of assets. See Defs'Memo. Mot. Sum. Jud. Exhibits N, and Exhibits O. 
Ms. Hampton filed "April 23 2004 Complaint" on Mr. Jensen and his Attorney to 
collect her portion to Interest Bearing Trust Account and other assets. It appears plaintiff 
has no interest to here Joint Tenant real estate. Therefore the Interest Bearing Trust 
Account has been recently depleted as well. By September 13,2006 this case dismissed 
against plaintiff (see Defs'. Memo, exhibit O). 
Plaintiff tried to contact Defendants' (PTS and CH) on August 14, 2006 by 
certified mail requesting information on the ownership of the Court ordered real estate 
sell to assist in the 2004 suit. Due to no response to her request, several more certified 
and then strict certified letters followed, see TH memo. Opp. to Defs' mot. Sum. Jud; TH 
Affid. Exhibits 1 through 7). 
On July 2007 Defendants had admitted a Mistake to plaintiff's House Parcel. 
Thereafter, Defendants' provided Plaintiff with the Sellers Settlement Statement 
remaining funds of $42,060.94. 
Plaintiff filed August 14, 2007 complaint against Defendants' in order that no Statute of 
Limitations could be use against her for their Oral Agreement. Defendants' served on or 
about December 2007. 
Defendants' stated; "In an effort to avoid litigation, ...I prepared a proposed 
settlement agreement, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 5", (see Affid. of CH pg. 5 
at no. 19). 
The figure of $21,185.47 is approximately half of that $42,060.94 to satisfy 
plaintiff for her interest lost due to the Defendants' error on House Parcel. Defendants' 
arranged an office meeting on August 27, 2007 with Plaintiff at the offices of 
Professional Title service. Defendants' requested Plaintiff "releases any all claims of any 
kind and nature regarding the following described lands: ....to document said release of 
interest, (see Affid. TH, Exhibits 9 at A (PTS000658) also Defendants' requested 
Plaintiff to ".. .dismiss, or cause to be dismissed that certain action filed August 14, 
2007....First Party will not bring any further actions against Second Party regarding the 
lands described herein or any other matters alleged in said action, see at B (PTS000658). 
Defendants' also provided a "Disclaimer" for Plaintiff to sign,".. ..Tonda Lynn 
Hampton, hereby disclaims any and all interest, or any kind and nature, legal and/or 
equitable, in and to the following described tract of land" also provides a legal 
description of that House Parcel, (see exhibit 9, at PTS000660 and PTS000661). 
Plaintiff refused to sign Settlement Agreement due to issues that were not 
discussed prior. Defendants' conduct continued to conceal the operative facts, failure of 
the plaintiff to discover the operative facts that are the basis of its cause of action within 
the limitations period, and due diligence by the plaintiff until discovery of those facts. 
However Defendants' within their Settlement agreement, if signed, would have released 
all and any Claims, (see Plaintiffs Memo. Oppos. to Def. Sum Jud., TH affid. exhibits 
14) also (TH affid. exh. 25, Parties meeting Aug. 27,2007). 
When plaintiff could not sign to that Settlement Agreement; Defendants' retracted all 
documents. Plaintiff began questioning Defendant(s): 
Clay- "I'm not saying it's not fraudulent, I'm saying, we are not the ones who are 
to determine that per say the Court ordered it sold". 
Tonda-"The Court ordered it sold, this here, of.. .how can I have a deed of a 1998 
May 6 of that house in my name, ...April of 97 which you record in 99, but I've 
got a 98 deed. So in 99 he throws all these attachments on there and the reason 
why it's fraudulent is because: that is the house 
Clay-1 know we've been through that... 
Clay- "We included the House 
Tonda- "This is what I'm saying 
Clay- We included the title on the house.. .and that's why 
Tonda- but the rest of the property, what I'm saying is these are fraudulent, a 
thorough check would have caught this and questioned it, because why is it in 96, 
err 97 being recorded in 99 of that description that I own on a 98 title? Uh, know 
what I'm saying.. .A quit claim deed. That description shows, and proves that 
that's all fraudulent and they were attached to some document or he, I have no 
idea, a thorough research, wouldn't a title company be responsible? 
Clay- it included all of the land that's true 
Tonda: Plus the house 
Clay: Right 
Tonda: which there was a 98 deed 
Clay: that's why we're dealing, specifically with the house as far as 
(see Plaint. Memo. Opp to Def. Sum. Jud., TH affid. exhibit 25 all of pg. 8). 
Clay- I'm willing to deal with the home, (see pg 9). 
It appears; during the discovery stage that Defendants' services were involved in all the 
Real estate that was eventually depleted by Grantee, Double J. Triangle, LLC. 
Sellers Settlement Statements of: $ 200,000.00; $ 135,000.00; $300,000,00; 
$ 600,000.00; $ 125,000.00 last sell of property approximately 2007. 
(see Plaint. Memo. Opp. TH. Affid. Exh. 11 & 12); (see Def. Memo. Sum. Jud. CH affid. 
Exhibit 1 & 2). 
Plaintiff never gave any Oral or Written documents to allow any of her Joint 
Tenant ownership to change ownership, see Hearing Trans, pg. 37 paragraph 3). 
During 2008 discovery, Defendants provided documents from their personal files, 
which are not public record. Documents appear to be Altered in ownership. This 
document was never produced prior to this case. Therefore, Defendants' should not be 
able to claim Statute of Limitations. 
On June 10, 1998, a Policy is issued; Titled to K.C. Jensen and Tonda Hampton, 
as Joint Tenant. Attached with a Legal description of approximately 4,100 acres, this 
document is altered in ownership, (see TH affid. exhibit 18, (PTS149)). 
Quit Claim Deed dated April 20, 1997 and recorded November 15,1999, over 
Two and a half (2 Vi) years later. Legal description is of Plaintiff s total Real Estate. 
Attachments are clearly fraudulent. These documents are recorded on the Request of 
Professional Title Services, (see TH affid. exhibit 19 and 20, (PTS000444 through 
PTS000449; PTS310 through PTS312; PTS422; PTS96; PTS309; PTS423)). 
Defendants' Conveyed 100% of Plaintiffs water rights, also unknown to her until 
the 2008 discovery stage, see TH affid. exhibit 22 all). 
Defendants filed Summary Judgment July 7,2009 which a Hearing was called 
September 21,2009. Also, State that she should have brought Fraud claim in prior case(s) 
and that Plaintiff can't go after these Defendants for Fraud. This limited Plaintiff to her 
case. The Court granted Motion for Summary Judgment on Res Judicata, Statute of 
limitations and Statute of Frauds against Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff argued Fraudulent Concealment and mentioned the Doctrine, (see 
Transcript of Hearing, pg. 28; pg. 41). 
Court did not allow Plaintiffs material evidence that would have exposed Defendants' 
Mistake/fraud that caused her to lose her Joint Tenant interest to the real estate over 4,100 
acres, and Tangible property that at one time listed for $ 3,250,000 dollars with a Real 
Estate Agent. Plaintiff, therefore became incompetent. 
At the hearing the court ruled Statute of Frauds against Plaintiff. Actual land for 
sell to Defendants'). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff filed Complaint after Defendants' did not keep his obligation to an Oral 
Agreement to correct the Mistakes. Defendants' were then served: 
Count I, Declaratory Judgment; 
Count II; Breach of Contract; 
Count HI; Breach of Covenant of good Faith and Fair Dealing; 
Count IV; Slander of Title; 
Count V; Negligence; = Duty of care in breach of duty; intended negligence unlawful 
interference with Hampton's recorded titled interest of Real Property; will establish at 
Trial; Defendants' issued documents to be recorded that are fraudulent; Plaintiff will 
establish at trial. (Note; followed by Rule 9(b) Pleading special matters. Plaintiff 
will establish at trial -pg. 12 as Discovery unfolds). 
Plaintiffs initial concerns are matters of law. With respect to the Defendants Summary 
Judgment claim of Res Judicata defense, the court improper applied to this particular 
case. Defendants do not meet the must elements. 
The Court next erred in finding that Statute of limitations applied, due to it 
appears that those claims have all been made, (see Hearing Transcript) and therefore, 
rejected the argument of Fraudulent Concealment. 
The court improperly created a standard requiring that Plaintiff should have raised 
fraud in a prior case prevented plaintiff to enter evidence, Therefore, causing Plaintiff to 
become incompetent, (see Third Amended Complaint, pg. 6; at 41 and 42 all subparts a 
through e). The court in this role impermissibly put itself in the position of an 
assumption. Had the court simply allowed Plaintiff to introduce her evidence to this case 
would have clearly been in Plaintiffs favor and exposed Defendants' misleading intent. 
The next error occurred where the court, using the improper standard, failed to 
recognize the evidence that had been presented within Plaintiffs Opposition to 
Defendants5 Summary Judgment followed with her Affidavit. Possibly, because of the 
court preventing her evidence. 
The Court next erred in finding that Statute of Fraud applies. First, the court 
incorrectly found that the provision of Plaintiff statement, it was (pass tense) property 
(land) (see Hearing Trans, pg. 21 thorough 30) that she was actually selling Land for 
$21,185.47. Plaintiff stated, "It (Land) really doesn't exist". 
Statutes of Frauds, the only purpose of which is to prevent fraud, to be used where 
the effect will be to accomplish a fraud and if the facts are such that it could be a virtual 
fraud to permit the defendant to interpose the statute, a court shall not listen to that 
defense. Wessel v Eilenberger, 2 I11.2d 522,119N.E.2d 207. To now rely upon the Statute 
of Frauds would have the effect of perpetrating a fraud, not preventing one. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs claim for an oral agreement is bared by the statute 
of frauds, which is stated in Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1, and provides as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of 
law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involves Defendants' that are claimed Res Judicata, however there are 
elements that are requires. However, Defendants' were not a party to any prior case filed 
by Plaintiff. Defendants' did present minimal documents in prior 1999 case that only 
confused the situation. 
Judge could weigh the factors and if found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
necessary factors exist, therefore finding that an Oral agreement did exist. 
Plaintiff points out that the district court made no effort to allow plaintiff to argue 
the Concealed Fraudulent Doctrine therefore, plaintiff could not defend the allegations of 
"Fraud, Breach of Contract, Breach of Covenant of good Faith and Fair Dealing, Slander 
of Title, or Negligence. 
The parties had agreed that $ 21,185.47.00 paid to plaintiff and plaintiff is to sign 
a title belonging to a description of land that of 6.32 acres. However, plaintiff 
arrived at the offices of Professional Title Services, to fulfill her obligation. But 
plaintiff did not agree to sign a Settlement Statement that required her to sign all 
interest, if any, to over 4,000 acres of Real Estate and to cause a certain action 
filed with the Seventh District Court to be dropped. In the event, that plaintiff 
disagreed to this newly presented document called a Settlement Statement, 
Defendants' withdrawals all those documents and the $21,185.47 dollars that they 
presented. 
Therefore, Defendant did not up hold their obligation to the oral agreement. 
Therefore, the "Chain of Title" remains defective. The defendants' malicious 
behavior is the very reason why plaintiff is Pro Se in her Suit against these 
defendants'. Defendants' Summary Judgment Undisputed Facts or on issues 
performed during the 1999 divorce cases. 
However, the Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine does apply. 
Res Judicata and Statute of Limitations do not apply to this particular caise. Due to the 
Defendants' continuing to Conceal their mistake. 
I. Tonda Lynn Hampto vs. Professional Title Service, a Corporation and Clay 
G. Holbrook, an individual. 
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S RULING THAT 
OE RES JUDICATA 
B. THE COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
C. THE COURT MPROERLY APPLIED STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
D. THAT COURT IMPROPERLY PREVENTED PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE 
OF FRAUD ISSUES 
E. THE COURT IMPROPERLY RULED AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S ORAL 
AGREEMENT 
F. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTON FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
CONCLUSION 
After the close of the Hearing the court addresses this case. The result of this case 
appears to have been a lack of recollection as to what evidence was actually presented 
within all the Pleading of Summary Judgment. An examination of that evidence shows it 
to be directly contrary to the court's ruling. 
The court's ruling also fails for the reason that it is based on an incorrect legal 
standard. The court improperly substituted its belief as to what constituted the Statute of 
Frauds. 
The court's ruling also fails for the reason that Statute of Limitations applies. 
Plaintiff was prevented to argue Conceal Fraud. Which Toll the Statutes. 
The court's ruling also fails for the reason that Res Judicata is improper, certain 
elements must be met. 
Also, Parties' determination and acceptance of that oral agreement should not 
constitute any of the defenses raised by the defendants. The correct legal standard 
required acceptance of the terms of the Oral Agreement between the parties. 
Finally, the court erred in awarding Defendants' Summary Judgment. Therefore 
should be stricken. 
The Plaintiff therefore respectfully request that the Judgments entered against her 
in this matter be vacated, that it be awarded its damages as prayed for in the complaint 
and that this matter is remanded. 
Plaintiff should be allowed a fair Trial on the Evidence or Summary Judgment if proper. 
DATED this /Jj day of March, 2010. 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, PRO SE, PLAINTIFF 
Tonda Lynn/Iiampton, 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Trial Court No. 070700813 
Notice is hereby given that Tonda Lynn Hampton, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals 
the final order of the Honorable Douglas B. Thomas entered in this matter on 
October 7, 2009. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
Dated; November 6, 2009. 
Lynn Hampton 
David P. Hirschi (1502) 
Justin R.Baer (11035) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES, et ah, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 070700813 
Judge Douglas B. Thomas 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 
Defendants Professional Title Services and Clay Holbrook. The following briefs were filed 
regarding this matter: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") and the 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Memorandum"), 
filed on July 13, 2009; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Opposition"), filed on July 20, 2009; Defendants' Reply in Support of 
their Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reply"), filed on July 31, 2009. 
OCT 8 2009 
ZNi* 
1 
A hearing was held on September 21, 2009, wherein Plaintiff Tonda Hampton appeared 
pro se. and Justin Baer appeared on behalf of Defendants Professional Title Services and Clay 
Holbrook. After reviewing the briefs filed by the parties and hearing oral argument the Court 
finds and orders as follows: 
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendants' Memorandum contains a statement of facts containing thirty-nine 
(39) numbered paragraphs. 
2. Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that kfc[f]or each of 
the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of 
the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials." 
3. Plaintiffs Opposition does not controvert any of Defendants'" statements of fact. 
Plaintiffs Opposition does not specifically identify any facts in dispute. Plaintiff did attach an 
affidavit, and although the Court read Plaintiffs Opposition and the affidavit in support, it 
appeared to the Court that the Opposition and affidavit did not provide any evidence 
controverting Defendants* statements of fact. 
4. Accordingly. Defendants' statements of fact, in paragraphs numbered one through 
thirty-nine in Defendants* Memorandum, are undisputed. 
RES JUDICATA 
5. Defendants have asserted that the doctrine of res judicata bars Plaintiffs claims of 
slander of title, negligence, and fraud. 
2 
6. Defendants provided evidence pertaining to lawsuits filed by Plaintiff in this 
Court in 1999 (case number 994700340), 2002 (case number 020701072), 2003 (case number 
030700004), and 2004 (case number 040700256). In each case, Plaintiff litigated the title of the 
real property at issue in this matter. 
7. In the lawsuit filed in 2002, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens against the real 
property in this case, and on the lis pendens Plaintiff stated, "During this case, a lis pendens 
needs to be in place to protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent (Kim Jensen) has been 
depleting, hiding, transferring out of Petitioner's name fraudulently." 
8. The undisputed facts in Defendant's Memorandum, and the evidence submitted 
by Defendants in support of those facts, demonstrate that in at least the 2003 suit, and the 2004 
suit, Plaintiff alleged that Kim Jensen (the defendant in those cases) had fraudulently removed 
Plaintiffs name from the title of approximately 4,000 acres of real property. 
9. Each lawsuit filed by Plaintiff against Kim Jensen was decided in Kim Jensen's 
favor, and the lis pendens filed by Plaintiff in those suits were ordered released. 
10. Plaintiff has brought this action against Defendants Professional Title Services 
and Clay Holbrook asserting that these defendants were involved in the alleged fraud that formed 
the basis of the facts underlying the previous lawsuits. 
11. The Court finds that Plaintiff was a party in the prior four lawsuits that she filed 
against Kim Jensen, the issue decided in the prior lawsuits (the status of title to the real property') 
is identical to the issue presented in this action, the issue in the prior lawsuits was completely, 
fully, and fairly litigated, and the prior suits resulted in final judgments on the merits. 
12. The Court also finds that the prior lawsuits filed by Plaintiff resulted in rulings 
that Plaintiff did not have title to the real property at issue. In this matter, Plaintiff has asserted 
that Defendants committed actions that caused her name to be removed from the title. However, 
if this Court has already held that Plaintiff did not have title to the real property at issue, then 
Plaintiff has no basis for claims against these Defendants. 
13. Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiffs claims of slander of title, negligence, 
and fraud are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and Defendants" Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED as to those claims. To the extent Plaintiffs additional claims of 
declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing are based upon facts underlying any of the four lawsuits, summary judgment is also 
granted as to those claims. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
14. Defendants have asserted that the doctrine of statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs 
claims of slander of title, negligence, and fraud. 
15. The statute of limitations for fraud is three years: CkAn action may be brought 
within three years . . . for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action 
does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(3). 
16. The statute of limitations for slander of title and negligence is four years: "An 
action may be brought within four years. . . for relief not otherwise provided for by law." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-2-307(3). 
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17. In conjunction with the 1999 lawsuit, the Court ordered the sale of two parcels of 
real property, which order was entered on January 23, 2002. Defendants acted as the closing 
agent for the sales of those two parcels of property, and the transactions both closed on January 
25, 2002. 
18. Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants were involved in 
fraud pertaining to certain deeds that were recorded before the transaction of January, 2002. 
19. The Court finds that statute of limitations on the claims of negligence and slander 
of title began to run at the time the alleged acts were committed, which were in or before 
January, 2002. Therefore, the four-year statute of limitations on the negligence and slander of 
title causes of action expired in January, 2006. 
20. Pursuant to statute, the statute of limitations on the cause of action for fraud 
begins to run upon the discovery of the fraud. 
21. As mentioned above in Paragraph 7 of this Order, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens 
against the real property at issue in this case on December 19, 2002. and on the lis pendens 
Plaintiff stated, "During this case, a lis pendens needs to be in place to protect the Real Estate 
involved. Respondent (Kim Jensen) has been depleting, hiding, transferring out of Petitioner's 
name fraudulently/* 
22. The 2004 lawsuit was filed against Kim Jensen on April 23. 2004. In the 
complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Kim Jensen "has now sold all of our other Carbon County Real 
estate, as of approx. 2004; once deeded in both of Plaintiff s and Defendant's names, approx. 
3,200 acres ...."' The complaint also alleges that "Petitioner [Tonda Hampton] has never given 
5 
any oral or written document to allow any ownership change on approx. 4,000 acre [w]hich are 
at issue.5* 
23. Based upon the statement made by Plaintiff on the lis pendens, alleging that Kim 
Jensen had been '"transferring [the property] out of [her] name fraudulently/' the Court finds that 
Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts and circumstances underlying the alleged fraud in this case 
by at least December 19, 2002. At the very latest, Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances underlying the alleged fraud in this case by April 23, 2004, the date when Plaintiff 
filed the 2004 complaint. Therefore, the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs fraud claims had run 
by December, 2005, or at the very latest, April, 2007. 
24. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in August, 2007. and by then the statute of limitations 
on Plaintiffs claims of fraud, negligence, and slander of title had run. 
25. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims of fraud, slander of title, and negligence are barred 
due to the running of the respective statutes of limitations, and Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED as to those claims. To the extent that Plaintiffs claim for a declaratory 
judgment is based upon the facts and circumstances underlying the title issues, summary 
judgment is also granted as to that claim. 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT 
26. Plaintiff has brought an action against Defendant for breach of an oral agreement. 
27. Plaintiffs causes of action for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are based upon the alleged breach of oral 
agreement. 
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28. Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint alleges that "On or about August 21, 2007, 
Clay Holbrook arranged for Plaintiff to meet at Professional Title Services, in Price. Utah to 
relinquish her rights beginning with that first sale of 6.32 acres for the amount of $21,185.47." 
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants "entered into an oral Contract with Tonda Hampton on 
or about August 2007 which he would compensate Plaintiff in return she would sign her total 
interest over to Professional Title Service that of 675 acre [sic] plus another 6.32 acres." 
29. At the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff further 
clarified the nature of the alleged oral agreement. Plaintiff stated during the hearing that the 
agreement was for Defendants to purchase Plaintiffs interest in 6.32 acres of real property. 
Plaintiff specifically stated that the alleged oral agreement was not for the settlement of any 
claims, but that it was for the purchase of an interest in land, and Plaintiff believed that she was 
surrendering her interest in real estate. Plaintiff asserted that the nature of the oral agreement 
was that Defendants would pay a sum certain, in exchange for which Plaintiff would execute a 
deed conveying real property to Defendants. 
30. The Court finds that Plaintiffs claim for an oral agreement is barred by the statute 
of frauds, which is stated in Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1, and provides as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in 
any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in 
writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
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31. According to the statute of frauds, any contract for the sale of land must be in 
writing, and an oral agreement for the sale of lands cannot be enforced. During the hearing on 
the summary judgment hearing, Plaintiff stated that there was no written agreement. 
32. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claim for an oral agreement for the sale 
of lands is barred by the statute of frauds and is unenforceable. 
33. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to 
Plaintiffs claims of breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
declaratory judgment (to the extent the claim for declaratory judgment pertains to Plaintiffs 
claim for breach of the oral agreement). 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED as to all of Plaintiff s claims for the reasons stated herein, and judgment is granted in 
favor of Defendants against Plaintiff. This Order shall act as the final order of this matter. 
is / day of Qckber,: DATED thi  T  of ULAOUZi , 2009 
I Si Qoucjfa L~Tlnorna5 
)UGLA^ B. THOMAS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form by. 
Tonda Lynn Hampton 
Plaintiff pro sc 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
AND NOTICE OF TIME TO OBJECT 
I hereby certify that the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS" MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed via First Class U.S. Mail and emailed this olcl day of 
September, 2009, to: 
Tonda Lynn Hampton 
P.O. Box 586 
Price, UT 84501 
Email: wytlady@hotmail.com 
Please take notice pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that any 
objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing 
the order shall file the proposed order upon being serve^ with an objection or upon expiration of 
the time to object. 
•J 
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David P. Hirschi (1502) 
Justin R. Baer (11035) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 303-5800 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Professional Title Services and 
Clay Holbrook 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES, et al, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 
Case No. 070700813 
Judge Douglas B. Thomas 
Defendants Professional Title Services and Clay Holbrook, by and through their 
attorneys, hereby provide notice to Plaintiff Tonda Lynn Hampton that the Order on Defendants* 
Motion for Summary Judgment has been executed by the Court, and was entered on October 8, 
2009. The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the Order, along with a copy of this 
Notice, were mailed and emailed to Plaintiff at the address below on this ( I day of 
October, 2009. 
1 
DATED this 13 day of October, 2009. 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
for Defendants Professional Title and 
Clay Holbrook 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this & . day of October, 2009.1 caused to be mailed and 
emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Tonda Lynn Hampton 
P.O. Box 586 




DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend XIV §1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof are citizens of the United States and the States wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Amendment VII 
In suits at common law, where the value= (the accepted principles or standards of a person or a 
group) in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) 
1. Rule: If judgment is rendered in favor of a plaintiff in a particular suit, the 
plaintiff is precluded from raising claims (in any future litigation) which were 
raised in (or could have been raised) in that lawsuit. 
2. Elements: Before a court will apply the doctrine of res judicata to a claim, three 
elements must be satisfied: 
1. There must have been prior litigation in which identical claims were raised 
(or could have been raised). In general, claims are sufficiently identical if 
they are found to share a "common nucleus of operative fact." 
2. The parties in the second litigation must be identical in some manner to 
the parties in the original litigation, or be in privity with the parties in the 
first action. 
Note: A party is considered to be in privity with a party in the original 
litigation if: 
1. The nonparty succeeded to the interest of a party; 
2. The nonparty, though it did not technically participate in the first 
suit, controlled one party's litigation in that suit; 
3. The nonparty shares a property interest with the party; 
4. The party and the nonparty have an agency relationship 
(agent/principal); or 
5. The party otherwise adequately represented the interest of the 
nonparty in the previous litigation. 
3. There must have been a final judgment on the merits in the original 
litigation. Note: Not all final judgments are based on the merits of the case 
(i.e., cases dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, etc.). 
3. Scope: Res judicata bars relitigation of claims that were previously litigated as 
well as claims that could have been litigated in the first lawsuit. 
4. Co\mterclaims:Res judicata is generally not applied to potential counterclaims by 
defendants, so defendants are not necessarily barred from raising a counterclaim 
in future litigation. However, remember that all counterclaims must conform to 
FRCP Rule 13(a), and that some counterclaims are compulsory (must be raised in 
original litigation or they are waived). 
Fraudulent Concealment, Self-Concealing Conspiracies, and 
the Clayton Act 
Richard F. Schwed 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 4B of the Clayton Act provides a four-year statute of limi-
tation for all civil antitrust actions brought under the Act. iThe doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment, however, allows courts to toll this 
statute of limitation when the defendant conceals the acts giving rise 
to the cause of action. This doctrine prevents wrongdoers from un-
fairly using statutes of limitation to escape sanction. 
Although the judiciary originally created this exception for fraud 
actions, ithe Supreme Court later expanded the doctrine to be "read 
into every federal statute of limitation." lln antitrust cases, courts 
have required that the plaintiff plead and prove three elements in order 
to toll the statute of limitation: (1) the defendant concealed the con-
duct that constitutes the cause of action; (2) the defendant's conceal-
ment prevented the plaintiff from discovering the cause of action; and 
(3) the plaintiff exercised due diligence in attempting to discover the 
cause of action. lApplication of the first element, the concealment re-
quirement, has created uncertainty and division among the courts. _Specifically, the 
courts disagree as to whether the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant concealed the wrong with affirmative acts beyond 
those necessary to create an antitrust violation, or whether it is suffi-
cient for the plaintiff to show that the defendant committed a "self-
concealing" wrong. -
lClaytonAct § 4B, 15 U.S.C § 15b (1988). Section 4B states: "Any action to enforce any 
cause of action under sections 15, 15a or 15c of this title shall be forever barred unless com-
menced within four years after the cause of action accrued." Section 15 provides a private civil 
cause of action for violations of all federal antitrust laws; section 15a provides the federal govern-
ment with a civil cause of action; and section 15c provides state attorneys general with a civil 
cause of action. 
Although a part of the Clayton Act, the four-year statute of limitation governs 
violations of 
all "antitrust laws," which include the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988), the 
Sherman Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988), and the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1988); see 
also Nashville 
Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1958); PHILLIP AREEDA, 
ANTITRUST ANALY-
SIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES, § 159, at 75 n.82 (3d ed. 1981). 
2Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1875). 
3Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,397 (1946). 
ASee, e.g., Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445 (6th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); Guido Saved & Lisa Saveri, "Pleading Fraudulent Con-
cealment in an Antitrust Price Fixing Case: Rule 9(b) v. Rule 8", 17 U.S.F. L. REV.631,635,637 
(1983 ). 
5See infra section I.C. 
6See infra section I.C. 
CLAYTON ACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND TOLLING 
BY FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
T H E multiplicity of treble damage actions l brought as a result of the Gov-
ernment's convictions 2 in 1960 of electrical equipment manufacturers for con-
spiracies in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act3 raises the question 
whether the federal equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the four 
year statute of limitations emboiiied in Section 4B of the Clayton Act.4 The 
judicially created doctrine of tolling by fraudulent concealment was originally 
applied only to bills in equity, but was subsequently extended to actions at law/' 
It provides that a statute of limitations does not begin to run at the time of the 
commission of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the plaintiff's cause of 
action where a defendant has engaged in conduct intended to hinder or prevent 
plaintiff's acquisition of information disclosing the cause of action.6 The tolling 
of the statute of limitations ceases at the time the plaintiff discovers, or should 
have discovered, the facts upon which his claim is based. Therefore, the plain-
tiff will have the full period of the statute of limitations, dating from his dis-
covery, in which to bring his cause of action. To avoid the ordinary effect of a 
statute of limitations a plaintiff must generally establish that the defendant has 
committed an affirmative act of concealment.7 and that reasonable diligence 
would not have uncovered at an earlier date the facts constituting the plaintiff's 
claim.8 These.'requirements are not easily met, especially the requirement of 
reasonable diligence, which is strictly construed.9 Because conduct constituting 
1. Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1955). See notes 29 and 86 
infra and accompanying text. 
2. For a concise account of the indictment.* and resultant convictions, sec Application 
of State of California, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961). 
3. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). 
4. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1958). The statute reads: 
Any action to enforce any cause of action under [the antitrust laws) shall be forever 
barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued. No 
cause of action barred under existing law on the effective date of this section . . . 
shall be revived by said sections. 
5. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874). 
6. Ibid.\ Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 190 (1884). 
7. Bates v. Prebk, 151 U.S. 149 (1894). If a fiduciary relationship is present, silence 
on the part of the party against whom the cause of action would lie is sufficient concealment. 
Young v. Howard, 120 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1941). The concealment must have resulted 
from the act of the person charged; a fraudulent conceatment by an agent will not bind the 
principal unless the latter induced or had knowledge of the concealment. Bryan v. United 
States, 99 F2d 549, 552 (10th Cir. 1938), cert, denied, 305 U.S. 661 (1939). 
8. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879). The plaintiff must fully allege the conceal-
ment in order to avoid summary judgment based on the bar of the statute of limitations. 
The allegation, therefore, to be complete, must set forth the nature of the transaction, the 
time of discovery, what the discovery is, how the discovery was made and why it was not 
made sooner. Id. at 140-41. 
9. See Wood v. Carpenter, supra note 8; Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co 288 
F.2d 80 (2d Cir.),-*rf. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961). 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one 
year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating 
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act 
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
